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The Demand and Standing Requirements in
Stockholder Derivative Actions
When a corporation is injured by insiders or outsiders,' one or
more shareholders may, in certain circumstances, bring a suit on
behalf of the corporation to redress the harm. 2 Historically, the
stockholder derivative suit has been the principal weapon of minor-
ity shareholders to cure abuses within the corporation. 3 There are
obvious dangers, however, in allowing a minority of shareholders
whose interests may be relatively small to bring an action on behalf
of a corporation. The alleged cause of action may be without merit,
or the costs of litigation coupled with the adverse effect on the
business relationship between the corporation and the party to be
sued may outweigh any recovery which could be gained. In these
situations a suit will be contrary to the best interests of the corpora-
tion. The derivative suit may also be abused by the filing of "strike"
or "blackmail" suits-actions commenced for their settlement value
with no expectation of securing any recovery for the corporation.'
This comment will examine two of the limitations on share-
holder derivative actions that courts and legislatures have fashioned
to minimize these dangers and to preserve the principle of corporate
law that the directors should govern a corporation: the requirement
that the shareholders exhaust intracorporate remedies and the re-
quirement that the shareholders establish standing to sue.'
I There is no distinction between an injury to a corporation caused by third parties and
one caused by its officers, directors, or stockholders. 12 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATONS § 5850, at 182 (rev. perm. ed. 1971).
2 Shareholders may not sue in their personal capacity for an injury to the corporation
even though they have suffered a pecuniary loss caused by a decline in the value of their stock.
If a shareholder suffers a direct injury, however, he may sue in his own right for his own
benefit. The proper classification of a shareholder suit is often the subject of dispute. See
Note, Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits, 110 U. PA. L. Rlv.
1147 (1962). This comment focuses solely on derivative actions.
See Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 77-82 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Dykstra].
Id. at 75.
Other devices limiting the ability of shareholders to maintain a derivative action are
state security-for-expenses statutes and the contemporaneous ownership requirement. See
Dykstra, supra note 3, at 88-97. "Standing" in the context of derivative actions-is not to be
confused with its more traditional meaning as defining when an individual can challenge
governmental action. As used in the present context, standing defines when minority share-
holders can sue despite the opposition of the board of directors or a majority of the sharehold-
ers. Use of this term in the derivative action context can be traced to Hawes v. Oakland, 104
U.S. 450, 462 (1882).
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To exhaust intracorporate remedies, complaining shareholders
must, before commencing suit, make demand on both the directors,
and the shareholders 7 to pursue the claim, or demonstrate why mak-
ing such demand would be futile. The demand requirement is pres-
ently codified in rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8
Compliance with the mandates of rule 23.1, however, does not auto-
matically entitle shareholders to bring a derivative action. If the
directors refuse to sue as demanded, their decision will be final
unless the shareholders can demonstrate standing to sue by proving
that the directors' decision was wrongful.9 The standing of minority
shareholders to sue may also be affected by a vote of a majority of
the shareholders not to sue.'0 The standing requirement, unlike the
exhaustion requirement, is not embodied in the Federal Rules, but
rather rests on the common law doctrine that minority shareholders
should not be able to sue on behalf of their corporations against the
will of the directors or a majority of the shareholders.
Although relatively straightforward in theory, the requirements
of exhaustion of intracorporate remedies and standing to sue have
been the subject of considerable confusion. This comment attempts
to resolve the confusion and provide a workable framework for the
courts.
I. THE DEMAND ON DIRECTORS REQUIREMENT
The requirement that demand be made on directors is embod-
ied in rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," which
provides that shareholders must allege with "particularity" the ef-
forts made to obtain the action they desire from directors or the
reasons for not making an effort. Many states have laws or court
rules containing similar provisions.'2 This comment will analyze the
judicial interpretation of the demand on directors requirement, the
£ See text and notes at notes 13-90 infra.
See text and notes at notes 91-148 infra.
Rule 23.1 states in relevant part:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right
of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association
having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall
be verified and shall allege .. .with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the
plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and,
if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain
the action or for not making the effort.
* See text and notes at notes 149-90 infra.
" See text and notes at notes 200-16 infra.
For the text of rule 23.1, see note 8 supra.
12 E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 23.1; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 1963).
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purpose of the requirement, and finally what excuses should be
sufficient to excuse a failure to make demand.
A. The Demand on Directors Requirement and the Courts
In surveying the cases that have interpreted the demand on
directors requirement, Professor Moore has stated that "there is no
unanimity of opinion amongst the courts, and probably the most
straightforward approach is to admit frankly that it lies within the
sound discretion of the court to determine the necessity for a de-
mand."1' 3 This vague standard of "sound discretion" has led to in-
consistent and confusing results because it has provided inadequate
guidance to courts faced with the question of whether a demand on
directors is necessary. 14
At one extreme, the Fifth Circuit 5 and several other courts'"
have been very liberal in excusing plaintiffs from making demand
on directors, interpreting the demand requirement in accordance
with the flexible standards of modern notice pleading.' 7 The Tenth
Circuit'8 has also taken a permissive attitude toward the demand on
directors requirement. At the other extreme, the First Circuit'" has
rejected the notice pleading interpretation, stating that rule 23.1 "is
not an ordinary, but an exceptional rule of pleading, serving a spe-
cial purpose, and requiring a different judicial approach."" ° Other
courts have followed this view.2' Much of the confusion surrounding
the inconsistent application of the demand on directors requirement
is attributable to a failure to understand the history and policies of
the rule.
11 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.19, at 254 (2d ed. 1975). Many courts have
accepted this summary of the law. E.g., Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" The inconsistent state of the case law interpreting rule 23.1 has been acknowledged
by the courts. See, e.g., DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 830 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950; Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792,
817-18 (5th Cir. 1970).
" Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 18, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Barr v.
Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
,7 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
" DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aft'd, 435 F.2d
1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970). But see Meyers v. Keeler, 414 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
" In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973).
20 Id. at 263.
21 Brooks v. American Export Indus., Inc., 68 F.RD. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jones v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kusner v. First Pa. Corp.,
395 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Phillips v. Bradford, 62 F.R.D. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Abrams v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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B. The Purpose of the Demand on Directors Requirement
In the leading nineteenth-century case of Hawes v. Oakland,22
the Supreme Court stated that before a shareholder could institute
a derivative action, he must
show to the satisfaction of the court that he has exhausted all
the means within his reach to obtain, within the corporation
itself, the redress of his grievances, or action in conformity with
his wishes. He must make an earnest, not a simulated effort,
with the managing body of the corporation, to induce remedial
action on their part, and this must be made apparent to the
court .?
The original purpose of the demand on directors requirement
is clear: to prevent courts from interfering with the internal affairs
of private corporations until all intracorporate remedies have been
exhausted .2 Forcing shareholders to exhaust intracorporate reme-
dies by first making demand on directors allows the directors a
chance to occupy their usual status as managers of the corporation's
affairs, giving the corporation an opportunity to take control of a
suit that will be brought on its behalf.25 The demand requirement
thus furthers a principle basic to corporate organization, that the
management of the corporation be entrusted to its board of direc-
tors.
The demand requirement also has several practical advantages.
Shareholders usually have little knowledge of the facts involved and
lack access to the books and records of the corporation. Directors are
generally familiar with the actions complained of and are therefore
22 104 U.S. 450 (1882). The Court relied heavily on an earlier English case, Foss v.
Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 2 Hare 461 (Ch. 1843).
23 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1882). In 1882, the Supreme Court adopted
Equity Rule 94 as a codification of the holding in Hawes. In 1912, the Court enacted Equity
Rule 27, which modified the previous rule by adding the phrase "or the reasons for not making
the effort." The change was prompted by the case of Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R.,
213 U.S. 435 (1909), which held that demand could be excused if its exercise would be futile.
Equity Rule 27 was adopted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as rule 23(b). Rule 23.1,
promulgated in 1966, substantially restates rule 23(b). Decisions prior to 1966 thus remain
authoritative. C. WRGHT, FEDERAL CoUawS § 3, at 318 (2d ed. 1970).
24 For other early Supreme Court cases concerning the demand on directors requirement,
see Wathen v. Jackson Oil Co., 235 U.S. 635 (1915); Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R.,
213 U.S. 435 (1909); Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell
Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903); Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U.S. 489 (1888); Quincy v. Steel,
120 U.S. 241 (1887); Dimpfell v. Ohio & M. Ry., 110 U.S. 209 (1884).
11 Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435, 446 (1909); Brody v. Chemical
Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257,
263 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
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in a better position to evaluate whether a claim is justified.2 The
grievance may be resolvable without litigation, thus easing the bur-
den on the courts. 27 If litigation is appropriate, acceptance of the
demand places the resources of the corporation, including its infor-
mation, personnel, funds, and counsel, behind the suit.2 The direc-
tors, perhaps unlike derivative plaintiffs, have a fiduciary obligation
to the corporation to act in its best interest in maintaining the
action. 29 In addition, requiring demand as a condition precedent to
a derivative action helps curtail the initiation of strike suits brought
solely for their settlement value."0
The demand requirement also imposes little hardship on the
complaining shareholders. The requirement can be satisfied by sim-
ply mailing a copy of the complaint to the board of directors advis-
ing them that unless the corporation enforces its rights, the share-
holders will institute a derivative action against the alleged wrong-
doer.31 A refusal should ordinarily have to be secured, 32 but a failure
by the directors to act within a reasonable time should suffice to
satisfy the demand requirement.33 Once demand on the directors
has been made and rejected, the exhaustion requirement of rule 23.1
is met and the rule does not bar a derivative action.34
Z, Brooks v. American Export Indus., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Abrams
v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Tasner v. Billera, 379 F.
Supp. 815, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
2 Lerman v. ITB Management Corp., 58 F.R.D. 153, 158 (D. Mass. 1973); Baffino v.
Bradford, 57 F.R.D. 79, 81 (D. Minn. 1972); Weiss v. Sunasco Inc., 316 F. Supp. 1197, 1206
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
28 Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit,
73 HARV. L. REv. 746, 749 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Demand on Directors].
21 Tasner v. Billera, 379 F. Supp. 815, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1974). This same fiduciary duty will
obligate the directors to pay heed to a meritorious shareholder demand. Id.
3D Demand on Directors, supra note 28, at 749.
3' Tasner v. Billera, 379 F. Supp. 815, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
32 Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 877 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
3 In Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912), for example, the
plaintiff demanded in writing that the directors commence an action and gave the directors
ten days to act upon the demand. When no action was taken within the time limit, the
shareholder brought a derivative suit. The court held that the demand requirement was
satisfied. Id. at 14-15, 99 N.E. at 141. But cf. Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (1887) (plaintiff
not permitted to file suit thirteen days after making demand). In cases involving complex
causes of action, directors should be given sufficient time to make a thorough investigation
before a failure to act is allowed to satisfy the demand requirement.
:" After demand has been made and rejected, courts should not impose overly formal
pleading requirements since the shareholders have exhausted intracorporate remedies. But
cf. Long v. Stites, 88 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706 (1937) (court held that
the particularity requirement of rule 23.1 was not satisfied even though shareholders alleged
that demand was made and rejected on a certain date, and subsequently a registered letter
was sent to the directors notifying them that the suit would be instituted). Even if the
[44:168
Stockholder Derivative Actions
C. Excuses for Failing to Make Demand on Directors
Given the advantages of the demand requirement and the ease
of compliance, the shareholders should be required to make de-
mand in almost every case.35 The proper standard for requiring
demand should be that demand is necessary if there is any chance
that the directors may take remedial action in response to the
shareholders' complaint.3 ' This remedial action need not take the
form of litigation; it is hoped that demand will foster informal reso-
lution of differences. 3 A failure to make demand should be excused
only if requiring exhaustion would certainly be futile. The applica-
tion and advantages of this standard can be demonstrated by exam-
ining several of the grounds that have been used to excuse demand.
1. Control. An argument frequently advanced by shareholders
to excuse their failure to make demand is that demand would be
futile because the directors are controlled by the alleged wrong-
doers. Some courts have relied on this rationale to excuse a failure
to make demand even though the complaining shareholders alleged
no facts supporting their claim.3 9 In the early case of Doctor v.
Harrington,40 for example, the Supreme Court held that an allega-
tion that a wrongdoer controlled the directors, without any facts
demonstrating how this control was obtained or exerted, was none-
theless sufficient to excuse demand.' The more recent case of de
Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co.12 also illustrates a tendency to excuse
demand on the basis of questionable allegations of control. Two
members of a five-man board of directors were concededly hostile
to the shareholders' claim against the third-party wrongdoer.4 3 The
other three directors had stated in depositions that they were not
controlled by the outsider, would investigate the plaintiffs' com-
shareholders have complied with the demand on directors requirement, they still must estab-
lish standing to sue. See text and notes at notes 149-216 infra.
11 Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 877 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
3, Tasner v. Billera, 379 F. Supp. 815, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
37 Lerman v. ITB Management Corp. 58 F.R.D. 153, 157-58 (D. Mass. 1973); Weiss v.
Sunasco Inc., 316 F. Supp. 1197, 1206 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
3' E.g., Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435 (1909); Doctor v. Harring-
ton, 196 U.S. 579 (1905); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1955); Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
11 E.g., Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905).
I d.
" See Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1909).
" 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
" Id. at 814.
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plaint, and would take appropriate action." In certain instances, the
three had voted contrary to the wishes of the third-party wrong-
doer . 5 Nevertheless, the court held that demand was not required
because the three directors were elected by the outsider, had taken
little interest in the corporation's affairs, and were therefore not
"the kind of active and aggressive majority that would be likely to
undertake the difficult and demanding task of prosecuting a law-
suit."46 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, noting that "[c]ourts have
generally been lenient in excusing demand . 7
The facts of de Haas present a close case. The court may have
been correct that the directors probably would not have diligently
investigated and acted upon the shareholders' complaint. But given
the contrary claims of the directors and their previous history of
independent voting, demand should have been required. If the
directors rejected the demand, the complaining shareholders could
then institute the suit-after the corporation had been given a
chance to vindicate its own rights."
The majority of the cases have taken the view that unsupported
allegations that the directors are controlled by the alleged wrong-
doers are insufficient to excuse demand.49 In cases where specific
uncontroverted facts are produced to support the allegation of con-
trol, courts have properly held that making demand on directors
would be futile." In these instances the interests of the directors are
clearly antagonistic to those of the shareholders, rendering the de-
mand requirement a useless formality. 51
2. Conflict of Interest. A second ground often advanced by
'4 Id.
4Id.
"Id.
" 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970).
The minority shareholder would then have an opportunity to prove that the directors
were controlled in order to establish standing to sue. See text and notes at notes 164-166 infra.
11 E.g., In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
857 (1973); Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Abrams v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361 (N.D. 111. 1974); Baffino v. Bradford, 57
F.R.D. 79 (D. Minn. 1972).
"o In most of these cases the wrongdoer owned a substantial percentage of the stock in
the complaining shareholders' corporation. See, e.g., Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty
Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955); Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Dopp v.
American Electronic Labs., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). A particularly appropriate
case for excusing demand because of control is Maxwell v. Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. Co.,
47 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 131 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1942), where
it was alleged that the individual defendant held the majority of the stock, that such stock
ownership gave him complete control of the election of directors and the management of the
business, and that he had not permitted corporate meetings to be held for the last five years.
5' See Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435, 451 (1909).
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complaining shareholders to justify their failure to make demand on
the directors is that the directors would not prosecute the claim
vigorously because of a conflict of interest.12 In cases of an actual
conflict of interest-as where the same people are the directors of
the plaintiffs' corporation and of a second defendant corporation, 13
or where the directors have a substantial financial interest in an-
other defendant corporation 54-demand should not be required. But
courts should carefully scrutinize the facts to ensure that the alleged
conflict of interest is genuine.
The case of Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp."15 illus-
trates the proper judicial approach to an allegation of conflict of
interest. In Landy, shareholders of an insolvent bank brought ac-
tions against numerous defendants to recover losses sustained in
various security speculations. The shareholders alleged that no
demand was necessary on the FDIC (which was acting as receiver
for the bank) because of various conflicts of interest faced by the
FDIC. 6 The court examined the arguments for each of the supposed
conflicts, 57 found none of them persuasive, 5 and therefore held that
demand was required.
Thus, allegations of conflict of interest, like allegations of con-
trol, should not automatically obviate the demand requirement.
Only in cases where the interests of the directors are clearly adverse
to the interests of the shareholders should demand not be required.
3. Director Participation in the Transaction Attacked. Courts
have had the greatest difficulty in determining whether demand
should be excused when the shareholders allege that demand would
be futile because the directors participated or acquiesced in the
challenged transaction. 5 Shareholders have argued that it would be
5' E.g., Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435 (1909); Landy v. FDIC, 486
F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft
Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955).
" Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435, 443 (1909); Phillips v. Bradford,
62 F.R.D. 681, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5, E.g., Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955).
486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
, Id. at 147.
, In Landy, the alleged conflicts were based on various statutory duties of FDIC. Since
the alleged conflict of interest was based solely on law, no trial of disputed facts was required.
5' Id. at 149-50.
E.g., Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976). In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257
(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 409 F.
Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Brooks v. American Export Indus., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cohen v. Industrial Fin.
Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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unreasonable to expect the directors to enforce the rights of the
corporation when the directors would in effect be suing themselves. 0
When a majority of the directors have engaged in fraud or self-
dealing, such as appropriating a corporate opportunity, courts have
generally not required demand. 1 But when a majority of the direc-
tors are accused of approving or passively acquiescing in an alleg-
edly injurious transaction, courts are split on whether demand
should be required.6 2 The majority view is expressed in the leading
1o E.g., Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 875 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Meyers v. Keeler, 414 F. Supp. 935, 938 (W.D.
Okla. 1976); Brooks v. American Export Indus., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 506, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1967). Some courts have accepted this
reasoning. In Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), the court
stated:
It is alleged that these directors 'have had knowledge of all the facts complained of herein
and have acquiesced and participated therein.' . . . The requirement of a demand
should be dispensed with, where it is clear that a demand would be a useless gesture.
Indeed, in cases such as this, where other representative actions by stockholders have
been 'settled,' against the real interests of the injured corporation, it would be the height
of folly to entrust the conduct of the litigation, either directly or indirectly, to the very
people who are responsible for the wrongs, according to the complaint.
In the event that the directors accept the shareholders' demand to institute a suit, but
eventually settle contrary to the interests of the corporation, the shareholders are not without
a remedy; they can sue the directors for breach of fiduciary duty. See also In re Kauffman
Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 267 (1st Cir.) (Coffin, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973).
11 E.g., Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167 (D. Conn. 1950); Craftsman Fin. & Mortgage
Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Abraham v. Parkins, 36 F. Supp. 238 (W.D.
Pa. 1940); Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 30 S.W.2d 976 (1930).
But cf. Watson v. United States Sugar Refinery, 68 F. 769 (7th Cir. 1895) (allegation that
majority of the directors are implicated in fraud does not eliminate necessity for demand).
In some cases, courts have excused demand even though only a minority of directors have
engaged in self-dealing. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964) (demand not required where two of five directors accused of
self-dealing). But cf. Bartlett v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 221 Mass. 530, 109 N.E. 452
(1915) (demand on directors required when only ten out of twenty-three accused of wrongdo-
ing). The recent case of Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976), suggests a new approach to the problem of
excusing a failure to make demand when a majority of the directors are accused of participat-
ing in an illegal or injurious transaction. The court stated that it attached "no significance"
to whether the directors could be held civilly or criminally liable; the resolution of this
question was relevant to the merits, not to whether demand on directors was necessary. Id.
at 878 n.9.
If the directors who once constituted a majority of the board are replaced with new
directors, demand must be made on the new directors. Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d
932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975); Brody v. Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111, 1114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1104 (1973); Nelson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 399 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (S.D. Cal.
1975); Independent Investor Protective League v. Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 571 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
" Most cases have refused to excuse the failure to make demand in this situation. E.g.,
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case of In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions,13 holding that the
mere approval of an allegedly injurious corporate transaction, ab-
sent self-interest or bias, is insufficient to excuse the failure to make
demand on directors." The approach in Kauffman is not free from
difficulty. Directors undertake affirmative duties of due care and
In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973);
Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Brooks v. Ameri-
can Export Indus., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F.
Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But see Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal
dismissed, 503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); Barr v. Wackman, 36
N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975); Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp.
1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
479 F.2d 257 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
Id. at 265-66. The court in Kauffman also had to, decide whether different standards
for demand on directors should apply in cases involving mutual funds. Most mutual funds
are operated not by their own employees but by separately owned external organizations,
usually called investment advisors. The investment advisor receives management fees for
these services. Because of this unique structure, the fund and its investment advisor stand
in a relationship different from that usually existing between buyers and sellers in corporate
contexts. The First Circuit, however, refused to excuse demand on an independent majority
of directors when a shareholder alleged a corporate injury stemming from the advisor-fund
relationship. Id. at 266.
The continuing vitality of this aspect of Kauffman has been called into question by the
recent case of Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Boyko, the
plaintiff brought a derivative action based on the allegedly excessive management fee sched-
ule existing between the fund and its investment advisor. No demand was made on the
directors because they had approved of the transaction attacked. The court acknowledged
that plaintiff's allegations were virtually indistinguishable from those in Kauffman and that
under prevailing authority the demand requirement would therefore need to be met. Id. at
694-95. The court held, however, that this case was distinguishable from Kauffman because
that case was litigated prior to the effective date of § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970), which provides in relevant part that
the investment advisor of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services. . . paid by such
registered investment company ....
The novel question before the court, therefore, was the interaction of this newly created
statutory fiduciary duty of the investment advisor with the demand on directors requirement.
The court held that in a derivative action based on § 36(b), the demand required by rule 23.1
need not be made whenever there is at least one interested person, as that term is defined in
§ 2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970), on the board of directors of the mutual fund. Id.
at 697. The holding of the court was premised on its observation that "the derivative action
designed expressly to enforce the specific fiduciary duty created by Rule 36(b) should not be
rendered meaningless by an application of the more general provisions of Rule 23.1 and the
case law generally applicable to derivative actions." Id. at 696.
The reasoning of the court is suspect. Forcing a shareholder to exhaust intracorporate
remedies by mailing a copy of the complaint to the directors of the fund before bringing a
derivative action would hardly seem to frustrate the policies embodied in § 36(b). It is also
significant that the legislative history of § 36(b) does not mention any modification of the
traditional exhaustion requirement, suggesting that none was intended. The court in Boyko
could have excused the failure to make demand on more conventional grounds, since the
fund's directors had admitted their opposition to the suit. Id.; see text and notes at notes
79-86 infra.
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diligence in addition to their obligation to avoid breaches of their
fiduciary duty of loyalty." A director does not exempt himself from
liability by passively rubber-stamping decisions that cause harm to
the corporation.6 However, there are compelling reasons for requir-
ing demand when the only justification for a failure to make de-
mand is that the directors acquiesced in the transaction under at-
tack.
First, it is unclear that acquiescence in an illegal or injurious
transaction absent self-interest or bias should create an irrebuttable
presumption that directors would not entertain a claim for relief,"
particularly when a third-party wrongdoer is involved. When the
claim is that the transaction between the corporation and a third
party violated positive law, such as the antitrust laws,68 the directors
would probably not be barred by the in pari delicto defense from
suing the third party.69 Similarly, when the allegation is that the
corporation was fraudulently induced to enter a contract harmful to
the corporation, the directors could take appropriate measures to
void the contract and recover any damages suffered.7 0 Even when no
third-party wrongdoer is involved, demand should arguably still be
required to give the directors an opportunity to fulfill their fiduciary
obligations and to correct any harm they may have caused." The
See generally Dyson, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 INn. L.J. 341 (1965);
Feuer, Liabilities of Directors and Officers, 5 N.Y.L.F. 127 (1959).
" See Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
" "The directors represent all the stockholders and are presumed to act honestly and
according to their best judgment for the interests of all." Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold
Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903). In In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257,
266-67 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), the court emphasized that participation
in an injurious or illegal transaction or approval of it does not extinguish, but rather refocuses
the fiduciary duty of the directors to act in the best interests of the corporation by rectifying
their prior error in judgment.
" See In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 261 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973).
' Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). Although
the in pari delicto defense has traditionally been available in private securities actions, see
generally Comment, Plaintiff's Conduct as a Bar to Recovery Under the Securities Acts: In
Pari Delicto, 48 TEXAs L. REV. 181 (1969), the modem trend is to reject the defense in
securities actions. See Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975) (Wisdom, J.),
vacated on other grounds, 96 S.Ct. 3161 (1976); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d
1136 (2d Cir. 1970). See generally Comment, The Demise of In Pari Delicto in Private Actions
Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 572 (1972).
,1 Contracts induced by fraud are voidable. See 1 CORBIN ON CONTACTS § 6, at 12-13
(1963).
"In Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
841 (1964), demand on directors was not required where two of the five directors diverted
corporate assets while the others failed to protect the corporate interest. Rather than denying
the acts alleged in the complaint, the defendant directors claimed that demand would not
be futile because they had taken various rehabilitative measures, such as changing the mem-
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directors will have every incentive to take such action to avoid a
subsequent shareholder suit against them for their alleged previous
wrongdoing.
Second, eliminating the necessity for demand on the basis of
allegations that the directors participated in an injurious transac-
tion would seriously undermine the demand on directors require-
ment. Complaining shareholders almost invariably allege some ille-
gal transaction or conduct harmful to the corporation.7" If such alle-
gations were sufficient to excuse a failure to make demand, then
such failure would be excused in nearly every case because the direc-
tors have a duty to participate in all major transactions of the corpo-
ration.73
Finally, excusing a failure to make demand because the direc-
tors participated in an illegal or injurious transaction would greatly
encourage&shamnpleading. Minority shareholders should not be al-
lowed to name directors as defendants for participating in the chal-
lenged transaction and then bootstrap the argument by asserting
that since the directors are being sued, they cannot be relied upon
to prosecute the action.74 The resolution of the question of director
liability for participation in a transaction harmful to the corporation
requires an extended inquiry into the merits of the shareholders'
complaint, an inquiry inappropriate to the threshold issue of ex-
haustion of intracorporate remedies." Unless the shareholders spe-
bership of the board of directors, employing a law firm to act as counsel, procuring a reputable
accounting firm, circulating financial statements, and obtaining guarantees for outstanding
loans. Although the court found these rehabilitative measures inadequate to excuse the fail-
ure to make demand, the case illustrates that demand may have a salutary effect even if the
directors are guilty of wrongdoing.
72 In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
857 (1973).
" But see Graham v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963)
(holding that directors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates).
7, One court has said of this practice:
This c6mplaint has a bold and expansive thrust. It attempts to solve the problem of the
specificity of demand under Rule 23.1 . . . by a simple device. It simply sues everybody
.... The plaintiff then "bootstraps" the argument, by asserting with an air of injured
innocence, that since she is suing the. . . directors as well, how can she be expected to
go to them for relief? . . . It is not for the plaintiff herself to build a wall around ...
[a] director . . . and then tell him he cannot jump over it.
Phillips v. Bradford, 62 F.R.D. 681, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"' Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976). In Papilsky v. Berndt, 503 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974), the Second Circuit rejected a claim that a limited inquiry into
the merits was appropriate in determining whether demand on directors was necessary. But
cf. Meyers v. Keeler, 414 F. Supp. 935, 939 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (the court conducted an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether demand on directors was necessary).
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cifically allege fraud76 in the complaint or conclusively demonstrate
by affidavits77 that the directors are interested in the transaction
attacked, demand should be required. If demand is made and re-
jected, the complaining shareholders will then have a full opportun-
ity to prove their claims that the directors are liable for participa-
tion in an injurious transaction. 71
4. Director Opposition to Suit. Some cases have held that
demand is not required when the directors have made it clear that
they are opposed to bringing the suit urged by the complaining
shareholders.7 1 In Nussbacher v. Continental Illinois National Bank
& Trust Co.,"0 for example, the plaintiff brought a derivative action
against the directors of the corporation and Continental Bank for
injuries resulting from an allegedly illegal credit plan. The directors
had previously refused to institute a suit in an almost identical
action in another jurisdiction."' In addition, the chairman of the
board of directors had stated in an affidavit that he was opposed to
the commencement of a lawsuit against the bank, believing it to be
inconsistent with the best interests of the corporation.12
Citing the obvious opposition of the directors, the plaintiff
claimed that no demand on directors was necessary." The defen-
dants argued that demand should be required since there was no
showing of any disability making the directors unable to act impar-
tially in the best interests of the corporation. The court felt that
the defendants' position would require it to evaluate the wisdom of
the directors' decision not to sue. The Seventh Circuit therefore
rejected the defendants' argument, stating that the business judg-
ment of the directors was relevant to the merits of the transactions
complained of and not to whether demand was required." Finding
"the message . .. loud and clear that under no circumstances
would the board of directors have approved the corporation bringing
7, Fraud must be specifically pleaded. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
' On the use of affidavits, see note 90 infra.
7' See text and notes at notes 168-75 infra.
7' Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); In re Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Sec. & Antitrust Litigation,
392 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But see In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257,
263 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973) (a shareholder must show not only that the
directors are opposed to bringing the suit, but that they are "incapable of doing their duty").
518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
, Id. at 878.
'2 Id.
Id. at 875.
" Id. at 877.
Id. at 878.
[44:168
1976] Stockholder Derivative Actions
the action," '86 the court held that demand on directors was not re-
quired.
The holding in Nussbacher is consistent with the purpose of the
demand on directors requirement. 7 Since the directors had unequi-
vocally voiced their opposition to bringing an action against the
bank, no purpose would be served by exhausting intracorporate
remedies. That the directors may have made a correct assessment
of the merits of the corporate claim in declining to bring suit is
relevant to the plaintiff's standing to sue,88 not to whether intra-
corporate remedies need to be exhausted.
The demand on directors requirement should be strictly inter-
preted by the courts. Only in cases where the antagonism between
the plaintiff shareholders and the directors is unmistakable-such
as where the directors are controlled by the alleged wrongdoer, are
handicapped by a genuine conflict of interest, or are resolutely op-
posed to bringing suit-should the failure to make demand on direc-
tors be excused. Rule 23.1's standard of "particularity" should not
be satisfied by general unsupported allegations. Such a low stand-
ard would encourage boilerplate pleading to evade the demand
requirement in all derivative suits. 9 In cases where the facts con-
cerning control or conflict of interest are controverted, affidavits
should be considered." Participation by the directors in the chal-
U Id. at 879.
See text and notes at notes 22-24 supra.
See text and notes at notes 151-58 infra.
Lerman v. ITB Management Corp., 58 F.R.D. 153, 159 (D. Mass. 1973).
0 Courts are split on whether affidavits are appropriate for determining whether demand
on directors is required. Compare Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 265
(9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 956 (1965); Abrams v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62
F.R.D. 361, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Lerman v. ITB Management Corp., 58 F.R.D. 153, 156 (D.
Mass. 1973); and deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 813-14 (1968), aff'd,
435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970) (all approving use of affidavits), with Fields v. Fidelity Gen.
Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 682, 684-85 (7th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. American Export Indus., Inc., 68
F.R.D. 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
appeal dismissed, 503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974) (all rejecting use
of affidavits). Affidavits can be very helpful in analyzing the allegations of a complaint. In
Abrams v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361 (N.D. Ill. 1974), for instance, plaintiff
claimed that demand on directors would be futile because the alleged wrongdoer controlled
the board of directors. Id. at 367. Examination of uncontroverted affidavits, however, revealed
that a majority of the directors were completely independent. Id. at 368. The court properly
dismissed the action for failure to make demand on the directors.
It is conceivable that in some cases the use of affidavits will not be adequate to resolve
controverted issues of fact. In this event, demand on directors should be required. A trial-
type procedure is never appropriate in determining whether intracorporate remedies should
be exhausted. See text at note 75 supra; cf. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1956) (pretrial
hearing inappropriate to determine jurisdictional alignment). If the directors refuse to sue
after demand has been made, the shareholder will have a full opportunity to prove his
allegations at trial. See text and notes at notes 164-90 infra.
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lenged transaction absent self-interest or bias should not excuse the
shareholders from demanding that the directors take action. Fi-
nally, the wisdom of the business judgment of the directors should
not be relevant in determining whether exhaustion is required.
II. THE DEMAND ON SHAREHOLDERS REQUIREMENT
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a
demand on shareholders "if necessary."'" Many states have also
adopted a demand on shareholders requirement,12 although a few
jurisdictions require demand only on directors.13 Like the require-
ment of demand on directors, the requirement of demand on share-
holders rests on the premise that intracorporate remedies must be
exhausted before complaining shareholders can maintain a deriva-
tive action. Significant differences exist, however, between the two
types of demand. One of the primary advantages of the demand on
directors requirement is that it gives the directors an opportunity
to fulfill their normal role in managing the corporation." The de-
mand on shareholders requirement does not have this advantage
because shareholders normally do not play an active role in running
the corporation's affairs.9 Furthermore, unlike the demand on
directors requirement, the demand on shareholders requirement
may impose significant expense and delay on the complaining
shareholders and is therefore a potentially powerful deterrent to the
,, For the text of rule 23.1, see note 8 supra. The words "if necessary" apparently were
adopted from Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1882). Professor Moore has argued that
the phrase in rule 23.1 was meant to incorporate state law on whether the shareholders can
ratify fraud. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.19, at 23.1-257 (2d ed. 1975). It is highly
unlikely, however, that the words "if necessary" were intended to incorporate state law since
the original rule was promulgated before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a
critique of the Moore view, see Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Require-
ment: The Case for Limited Judicial Review, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1086, 1090 n.36 (1963).
Nevertheless, many courts in diversity actions have held that state law determines the extent
to which demand on shareholders is required, while federal law determines the requisite
particularity of pleading. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167 (D. Conn. 1950). For
a discussion of whether state or federal law governs the necessity of making demand on
shareholders in federal question cases, see note 131 infra.
,2 E.g., Amz. R. Civ. P. 23.1; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06.
'3 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 834 (West 1955); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney
1963).
" Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
,5 See text at note 25 supra.
" A demand on shareholders does, however, allow the shareholders to express their views
on the wisdom of bringing suit, elect a new board of directors to pursue the alleged cause of
action, join the suit as derivative plaintiffs, or attempt to induce the directors to bring the
action. There is no case law defining what the subject matter of a demand on shareholders
must be. See Demand on Directors, supra note 28, at 749.
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maintenance of derivative actions . 7
In response to these unique characteristics of the demand on
shareholders requirement, courts have adopted widely differing
theories on when demand on shareholders is necessary and when it
can be excused.
A. Differing Theories of Requiring Demand on Shareholders
Two different theories are used to determine when demand on
shareholders is necessary: the ratification theory and the business
judgment theory. 8 Under the ratification theory, followed in a ma-
jority of jurisdictions, demand is required only when the alleged
wrong can be ratified by a majority vote of the shareholders.9 The
rationale is that a demand presumes that shareholders are able to
take remedial measures: where shareholders have no power to ratify
actions, no purpose is served by requiring demand.'"' As a general
rule, conduct that is fraudulent, illegal, or ultra vires is nonratifia-
ble, and therefore demand on shareholders is unnecessary when
such conduct is alleged.'°' Because complaining shareholders almost
invariably allege that the action complained of falls within one of
" Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Mass. 1951).
, See, e.g., Leavell, The Shareholders as Judges of Alleged Wrongs by Directors, 35 TUL.
L. REV. 331 (1961); Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case
for Limited Judicial Review, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1086 (1963); Demand on Directors, supra note
28.
t E.g., Brody v. Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1104
(1973); Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Saigh v. Busch, 396
S.W.2d 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 942 (1966); Continental Sec. Co. v.
Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
The question of excusing demand because the wrong complained of is nonratifiable is
distinguishable from the question whether demand is required when shareholders have earlier
expressed their approval of the challenged transaction. Several courts have required demand
in the latter situation on the ground that the shareholders might be convinced by the demand
despite their earlier approval of the challenged transaction. E.g., Dickinson v. Consolidated
Traction Co., 114 F. 232, 246-47 (C.C.D.N.J. 1902), aff'd on other grounds, 119 F. 871 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 191 U.S. 567 (1903); cf. Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 72-73, 128
N.E.2d 429, 436 (1955) (prior ratification by shareholders could be negated by the acceptance
of a subsequent demand on shareholders). Other courts, however, have considered demand
futile where stockholders had approved of the transaction under attack. See, e.g., Security
Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963); Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk
Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968); Hyams v. Old Dominion Co., 113 Me. 294,
93 A. 747 (1915).
J Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
'" 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5795, at 96 (rev.
perm. ed. 1970). But cf. Mountain States Packing Co. v. Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 Pac. 737
(1929) (shareholders can ratify directors' fraud); Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128
N.E.2d 429 (1955) (same).
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these three categories, the ratification theory has the effect of evis-
cerating the demand on shareholders requirement.' 2
Under the business judgment theory, demand on shareholders
is required in all derivative actions where there is a disinterested
majority of shareholders. 03 Demand is required even when the
wrong is technically nonratifiable on the ground that the sharehold-
ers should be permitted to join in the suit,' 4 elect new directors to
pursue the cause of action,' 5 or persuade the directors to bring the
action.' 8 Most important, demand allows the majority of sharehold-
ers to exercise their business judgment whether the suit should be
brought.'' This theory assumes that the shareholders are entitled
to exercise their judgment whether the best interests of the corpora-
tion will be served by bringing the action, even though the power
to run the corporation's affairs is normally vested in the directors.'"
Neither theory provides an adequate conceptual framework for
determining when demand on shareholders is necessary. The ratifi-
cation theory allows complaining shareholders to circumvent the
demand requirement by simply pleading a cause of action that is
nonratifiable.' 0 The business judgment theory, on the other hand,
is excessively rigid, often requiring demand when the realities of the
modern publicly held corporation make the mechanics of demand
unfeasible."'
B. Excuses for Failure to Make Demand on Shareholders
Three reasons are typically given as excuses for failure to make
demand on shareholders: the lack of a disinterested majority of
shareholders, the nonratifiability of the wrong complained of, and
2 Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case for Limited
Judicial Review, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1086, 1086-87 (1963).
,13 See, e.g., Halprin v. Babbitt, 303 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1962); Pomerantz v. Clark, 101
F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951); American Life Ins. Co. v. Powell, 262 Ala. 560, 80 So.2d 487
(1954); cf. S. Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass.
99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950) (holding that a negative shareholder vote bars a derivative action).
"I, E.g., Halprin v. Babbitt, 303 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1962); Bell v. Arnold, 175 Colo. 277,
487 P.2d 545 (1971).
'5 E.g., Abraham v. Parkins, 36 F. Supp. 238 (W.D. Pa. 1940); Bell v. Arnold, 175 Colo.
277, 487 P.2d 545 (1971).
288 See Demand on Directors, supra note 21 at 750-51.
,° E.g., Halprin v. Babbitt, 303 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1962); American Life Ins. Co. v.
Powell, 262 Ala. 560, 80 So.2d 487 (1954); Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d
429 (1955).
"I The leading case expressing this view is S. Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England
Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950). ,
'o' Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959).
,,0 See Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Mass. 1951).
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undue expense or delay. Examining these reasons reveals the advan-
tages and disadvantages entailed by each.
1. The Lack of a Disinterested Majority of Shareholders.
Under both the ratification and the business judgment theories, the
lack of a disinterested majority of shareholders dispenses with the
necessity for making a demand on shareholders. When a majority
of the shareholders are the alleged wrongdoers and the demand
would therefore be a request that these shareholders sue themselves,
a failure to make demand has been excused."' Similarly, demand
has not been required when the alleged wrongdoers have working
control of the corporation by virtue of their stock ownership."2 The
difficult question is the amount of ownership necessary for working
control. Courts have generally been lenient in excusing demand on
shareholders where the wrongdoers owned a significant, although
less than majority, interest of the outstanding stock."3 This ap-
proach is consistent with the structure of large publicly held corpo-
rations with many small shareholders who are likely to be widely
scattered, uninformed, and unorganized." 4
2. The Nonratifiability of the Wrong. Under the ratification
theory, demand is not required when the alleged wrong is nonratifi-
able. Thus, in the leading case of Continental Securities Co. v.
Belmont,"' the plaintiffs brought a derivative action against the
directors of Interborough Rapid Transit System for allegedly misap-
propriating $4,500,000 by fraudulently and illegally issuing 15,000
shares of capital stock without receiving consideration."' Finding
the transaction attacked nonratifiable, the court held that the fail-
ure to make demand on shareholders was excused."7 The court spe-
l' E.g., Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Decatur Min-
eral Land Co. v. Palm, 113 Ala. 531, 21 So. 315 (1896); Fornaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg.
Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 274 Pac. 597 (1929); North v. Union Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 Ore. 483,
117 Pac. 822 (1911).
"1 Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435 (1909); Gottesman v. General
Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 F.
529 (6th Cir. 1915).
11 Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435 (1909); Hyams v. Calumet &
Hecla Mining Co., 221 F. 529 (6th Cir. 1915). But see Carroll v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
141 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1956).
"I Note, Shareholder Demand as a Condition Precedent to Derivative Suits-A Proposed
Compromise, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 196, 201 (1961).
" 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
' Id. at 11-12, 99 N.E. at 139-40.
"t Id. at 19-20, 99 N.E. at 142-43. The court emphasized that its decision was not in
conflict with the rule laid down in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882), that demand on
shareholders was necessary unless it was "not reasonable to require it." Id. at 461. Since the
shareholders could not ratify the alleged wrong, it would be "unreasonable and unnecessary"
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cifically rejected the theory that shareholders have power to exercise
business judgment whether a derivative suit should be brought.118-
Arguments that the shareholders should be given an opportunity to
take action, either by requiring the directors to bring suit"' or by
voting out the directors at the next election, 2 ' were also rejected.
Other courts, however, have found merit in the possibility that
shareholders might take remedial actions other than ratification
and have therefore required demand even when the alleged wrong
was nonratifiable.1 2' Critical to these cases is the assumption that
minority shareholders should not be able to institute a derivative
action against the will of the majority, regardless of the nature of
the wrong. 22 In American Life Insurance Co. v. Powell, 23 for exam-
ple, the court stated that, even though the complaint alleged fraud
on the part of the directors, a nonratifiable wrong, demand had to
be made on the shareholders because they have "the final authority
to determine whether or not it would be good business policy ' 124 to
sue.
The major conceptual problem with this argument is that, as a
general rule, shareholders exercise business judgment only by elect-
ing directors; thereafter, shareholders are excluded from participa-
tion in managing the corporation.12s It is normally the function of
to require demand. 206 N.Y. at 19, 99 N.E. at 142 (1912). The court's reasoning is specious
because Hawes dealt with demand on shareholders as a means of exhausting intracorporate
remedies and preventing collusive suits, not with ratification.
"I The court stated that the argument that the shareholders should be given an oppor-
tunity to exercise business judgment was "based upon an erroneous conception of the duties
and powers of the body of stockholders .... " 206 N.Y. at 16, 99 N.E. at 141. Other cases
have reached the same result. See, e.g., Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
"' 206 N.Y. at 17, 99 N.E. at 141-42.
120 Id.
2' See cases cited at note 103 supra.
122 E.g., S. Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass.
99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950). The court in Solomont emphasized that, even if the shareholders
have no power to ratify, "[t]he question whether it is good judgment to sue is quite apart
from the question of ratification." Id. at 111, 93 N.E.2d at 247. Other courts, however, have
rejected the distinction between ratification and a decision not to sue. E.g., Rogers v. Ameri-
can Can Co., 305 F.2d 297, 317-18 (3d Cir. 1962); Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 304, 141
A.2d 458, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1958). The two concepts are distinguishable in that ratification
rectifies the wrong, whereas a decision not to sue bars a recovery. The effect in both cases,
however, is the same-minority shareholders are precluded from'maintaining a derivative
action.
in 262 Ala. 560, 80 So.2d 487 (1954).
" Id. at 567, 80 So.2d at 492.
"I Shareholders do exercise some power on matters outside the ordinary business of the
corporation. Modern statutes typically require shareholder approval of such extraordinary
matters as sales of all or substantially all the corporate assets other than in the normal course
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the directors to decide whether or not to pursue a cause of action:
the best interests of the corporation are not served by pursuing every
claim.' 6 But, in the event that the directors either are unable to
exercise or fail to exercise sound business judgment,"' the share-
holders are the only corporate entity available to decide whether a
claim for the benefit of the corporation should be pursued. The
question then becomes whether minority shareholders should be
allowed to maintain a derivative action without first going to the
majority of the shareholders, who may believe that it would be
unwise or even ruinous for the corporation to sue. In this situation
the shareholders, the true equitable owners of the corporation,
should be given an opportunity to express their views on whether the
action should be brought.'1 This is particularly true for close corpo-
rations characterized by a small number of shareholders who have
expectations of participating in decision making and settling differ-
ences by majority vote.129
Even if shareholders have some residual power to exercise busi-
ness judgment whether a suit should be brought, demand on share-
holders should not always be required. Allowing shareholders the
opportunity to exercise business judgment assumes that they can do
so intelligently, based on adequate knowledge of the facts and legal
theories underlying the alleged cause of action. The decision
whether or not to sue is a complicated one for directors, even with
their access to information and counsel. It is difficult to imagine
how a shareholder in a large, publicly held corporation could make
an informed judgment on the wisdom of pursuing a claim arising
of business, amendments of the articles of incorporation, mergers, consolidations, and nonju-
dicial dissolutions. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONs 694-723 (2d ed.
1970). For a discussion of whether allowing shareholders to sue violates the "statutory norm,"
see Leavell, supra note 98, at 360-63.
' The cause of action may have little merit, or the costs of pursuing the claim may be
greater than any possible recovery.
I" See text and notes at notes 164-90 infra.
,21 The corollary of requiring demand to enable shareholders to exercise their business
judgment is that a negative vote by shareholders will bar a derivative suit. See text and notes
at notes 200-16 infra.
I" Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decisionmaking, 57 CALiF. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1969). For cases requiring demand on shareholders
where the number of shareholders is relatively small, see, e.g., Halprin v. Babbitt, 303 F.2d
138 (1st Cir. 1962) (92% of stock owned by one shareholder); Johnson v. Espey, 341 F. Supp.
764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (less than ten shareholders). In American Life Ins. Co. v. Powell, 262
Ala. 560, 567, 80 So.2d 487, 492 (1954), the court stated that requiring demand on sharehold-
ers to give them an opportunity to exercise their business judgment was particularly appropri-
ate in small corporations, where "democracy is usually a living fact rather than some fine
theory seeking expression in the dormant verbiage of corporate charters or the high-toned
eloquence of judicial discussion."
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from a complex corporate transaction, based on information com-
pressed into proxy materials. 3 ' If no fair and full consideration by
the other shareholders is possible, demand should not be required.''13
"' See Leavell, supra note 98, at 352-55.
' ' In Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965),
for example, the court refused to require demand where the corporation had 48,000 stockhold-
ers whose identity was constantly changing scattered all over the country. The court was
forced to distinguish an earlier case, Halprin v. Babbitt, 303 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1962), which
had held that demand was required. 303 F.2d at 141. The court stated that Halprin was not
controlling because in that case 92% of the company's stock was owned by one stockholder.
The court emphasized that Halprin was a diversity case, whereas the instant action was
brought under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
Therefore, Halprin did not "answer the question of what law presently governs." 334 F.2d at
817. The question of whether federal or state law governed whether demand was necessary
was crucial because, under the law of Massachusetts, demand would have been required
regardless of cost. Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Mass. 1951). Because of the
heavy financial burden involved, the derivative action probably could not have been main-
tained. The court held that the Massachusetts rule was inapplicable to a cause of action based
on the Investment Company Act, and therefore demand was not required. 334 F.2d at 819.
Levitt does not mean that federal courts should ignore state rules on demand on share-
holders whenever the cause of action is based on a federal statute. The opinion suggests that
if the number of shareholders were small, demand would be required even if a negative vote
by shareholders would bar minority shareholders from pursuing the claim. Id. at 818 n.2. The
decision is limited to situations where demand would involve prohibitive expense and would
not result in an "informed decision by the majority." Id. at 818. The underlying assumption
of Levitt is that federal courts will not follow state law if the state rules unreasonably frustrate
shareholder derivative actions based on federal statutes. The holding of Levitt on the choice
of law problem finds support in those cases which have held that shareholders need not meet
the requirements of state security-for-expenses laws in derivative actions based on federal
statutes. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964) (dictum); McClure v. Borne
Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Fielding v. Allen, 181
F.2d 163 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 340 U.S. 817 (1950). See Dykstra, supra note 3, at 84-88.
Levitt has had a mixed reception in the federal courts. Compare Jannes v. Microwave
Communications, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 18 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (federal law applies to whether demand
on shareholders is necessary in a federal securities action), with Jones v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (state law controls whether demand on
shareholders is necessary in an action under the Investment Company Act). In In re Kauff-
man Mut. Fund Actions, 56 F.R.D. 128 (D. Mass. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 257
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), the plaintiff brought a derivative action under
the antitrust laws against a mutual fund and its investment advisor. The plaintiff argued that
demand on shareholders was unnecessary because there were over 300,000 shareholders to be
contacted, id. at 139, a far greater number than the 48,000 found too large to require demand
in Levitt. The court, however, held that while Levitt was controlling in actions under the
Investment Company Act, demand on shareholders was required in actions under the anti-
trust laws. Id. at 139-40. The court in Levitt itself made this distinction. 334 F.2d at 820 n.5.
However, there is no logical basis for distinguishing between the Investment Company Act
and the antitrust laws. While the Supreme Court in United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917), stated that demand on shareholders was necessary in
antitrust actions, it did not alter the conditional rule of Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461
(1882), that demand could be excused where it would be unreasonable to require it. The
existence of over 300,000 shareholders seems a clear indication that requiring demand would
be unreasonable.
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The weakest arguments for requiring demand are that the other
shareholders can join in the action or put pressure on the directors
to bring suit. It is difficult to imagine what is gained, other than
moral support, by having additional shareholders join the action.3 2
At best, the result is that after the plaintiffs have expended consid-
erable resources in making demand, the derivative suit will be
larger. 33 Similarly, requiring demand so that the majority share-
holders may instruct the directors to bring suit serves little purpose.
Such a request by the shareholders has no binding authority on the
directors. 134 Moreover, the directors, with their greater access to
information and counsel, may have justifiably concluded that it
would not be in the best interests of the corporation to sue.
Forcing the complaining shareholders to make demand on the
other shareholders to remove the present board of directors and elect
a new one pledged to initiating suit also involves considerable diffi-
culty. 3 The advantage of requiring demand for this purpose is that,
if successful, the suit would be prosecuted by the directors rather
than by the shareholders. A campaign to elect new directors, how-
ever, might require an expensive proxy fight and cause great delay,
which could be fatal to the successful prosecution of the action. If
the insurgents were unsuccessful in removing the directors, as is
likely if the corporation were otherwise prosperous, their expenses
probably would not be reimbursed.'36 In cases involving closely held
corporations, however, demand on the other shareholders to elect
new directors might be required since the advantage of having the
suit brought by the directors of the corporation would outweigh the
minimal inconvenience to the complaining shareholders of making
demand. 37
The ratification theory is unsound, therefore because it over-
looks several other forms of remedial shareholder action. However,
this theory has the advantage of limiting the number of situations
232 See, e.g., Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
One commentator has argued that the advantage of this type of demand is that it gives
the majority shareholders the opportunity to prosecute the suit. See Demand on Directors,
supra note 28, at 751. The weakness of this argument is that it is the attorney, rather than
the shareholders, who actually controls the litigation. See Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency,
Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUn. 47, 56-61 (1975).
'' E.g., Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1959); Conti-
nental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16-17, 99 N.E. 138, 141-42 (1912).
23 E.g., Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 303, 141 A.2d 458, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16-17, 99 N.E. 138, 141-42 (1912).
'" Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
'" Demand on Directors, supra note 28, at 750-51.
1976]
The University of Chicago Law Review
where demand is unrealistically required. 38 A more straightforward
approach for the courts would be to excuse the failure to make
demand on shareholders, not because the alleged wrong is nonratifi-
able, but because requiring demand would be unrealistic and im-
practical.
3. Undue Expense or Delay. One of the major problems with
demand on shareholders is that the mechanics of making demand
may involve prohibitive expense or delay. Where the delay would
jeopardize the cause of action because of the statute of limitations
or result in irreparable harm to the corporation, courts have gener-
ally excused the failure to make demand. '39 However, courts have
been less sympathetic to the financial hardship that making de-
mand imposes on complaining shareholders. Although some courts
have not required demand when the plaintiffs have alleged that the
great number and dispersion of shareholders made demand finan-
cially unfeasible, 4' other courts have stubbornly insisted on the
requirement.1 41 In Saigh v. Busch, 42 for example, the court required
a demand on shareholders even though there were 10,867 sharehold-
ers owning 4,816,218 shares.14 1
A related problem occurs when the plaintiffs wish to make de-
mand but management wrongfully refuses to permit access to a list
of the corporation's shareholders. The courts have reached conflict-
ing results in this situation; some hold that withholding access is
sufficient to excuse the failure to make demand, 44 while others re-
quire the plaintiffs to seek judicial action to secure shareholder lists
and then make demand.145
'' It has been suggested that the ratification theory rests upon a policy of deterrence
rather than upon any conceptual limitations on the power of shareholders. See Note, The
Nonratification Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case for Limited Judicial Review,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 1086, 1093 (1963).
"I E.g., Interstate Refineries, Inc. v. Barry, 7 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1925); Campbell v.
Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 533, 134 A.2d 565 (Ch. 1957).
'4 E.g., Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959); Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 316
F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Berg v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry., 56 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Ky.
1944). This view has been recognized by the Supreme Court. In Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany
& S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435, 452 (1909), the Court stated that the demand requirement was
"intended to have practical operation, and to have that it must, as to its requirements, be
given such play as to fit the conditions of different cases."
'" E.g., Quirke v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 277 F.2d 705 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 845
(1960); Haffer v. Voit, 291 F.2d 704 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955); Saigh v.
Busch, 396 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 942 (1966).
2 396 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 942 (1966).
"I "The size of the corporation and the delay and expense in circularizing stockholders
widely scattered does not excuse the failure to seek action from the stockholders." Id. at 24.
' E.g., Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club, 16 N.J. 438, 109 A.2d 277 (1954).
' E.g., Bell v. Arnold, 175 Colo. 277, 487 P.2d 545 (1971).
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Requiring demand when it involves staggering expense can be
explained only by judicial hostility to the derivative suit. Derivative
actions can doubtless be abused by unscrupulous shareholders and
attorneys who bring suits solely for their settlement value. Deriva-
tive actions, however, can also serve important functions: minority
shareholders can serve as "needed policemen,""'4 who uncover
wrongdoing, pursue it publicly, and force directors and third parties
to account for injuries inflicted on corporations.' 7 Forcing share-
holders to expend huge sums in making demand deters not only
strike suits but also the minority shareholders' role as useful gad-
flies. In light of the salutary effects that a derivative suit can have,
demand on shareholders should not be required when the attendant
costs are unreasonable.18
Ill. THE PROBLEM OF STANDING TO SUE AFTER INTRACORPORATE
REMEDIES HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED
In addition to exhausting intracorporate remedies, complaining
shareholders must also demonstrate that they have standing to
sue.' To establish standing, the shareholders must demonstrate
that the decision by the directors or the majority of shareholders
against instituting suit should not be respected by a court. This
comment will now analyze the nature of the standing requirement,
what types of actions stockholders may bring, and, finally, the re-
cent trend of courts to grant separate hearings on the question of
standing to sue. A later section will explore the effect of a negative
shareholder vote on the standing of a plaintiff to maintain a deriva-
tive action.'50
A. The Nature of the Standing Requirement
Although some cases suggest that once the exhaustion require-
ment has been satisfied, either by a refusal by the corporation to act
after demand or by a determination that demand is not required,
shareholders may bring a derivative action,'5 ' the better view is that
shareholders may not maintain a derivative action until they have
' Dykstra, supra note 3, at 78.
" See Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951).
"' This is particularly true since there are alternative means of preventing strike suits.
See note 5 supra.
"' For a discussion of the meaning of "standing" in the derivative action context, see
note 5 supra.
' See text and notes at notes 200-16 infra.
' ' See, e.g., Papilsky v. Berndt, 503 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048
(1974).
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demonstrated their standing to sue.'52 Whether or not a corporation
shall seek to enforce a cause of action is, like other business ques-
tions, ordinarily a matter of internal management left to the discre-
tion of the board of directors. 3 The directors are not obligated to
pursue all causes of action and may justifiably waive a legal right
vested in the corporation in the belief that the corporation's best
interests will be served by not litigating. '54 The directors are pre-
sumed to act honestly and, absent unusual circumstances,'55 their
decision not to sue will be final. '56 Unless an equitable basis for
interference is shown, stockholders have "no more right to challenge
by a derivative suit a decision by the board of directors not to sue
than to so challenge any other decision by the board.115 7 Otherwise,
litigious shareholders, no matter how small their holdings, could
usurp the authority properly delegated to the board by bringing a
derivative action after the board had determined that litigation
252 The standing requirement has been described as the "sine qua non of the stockholder's
derivative right to sue." Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 915 (1963).
'1 United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917).
"I Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903). See also Hawes
v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 456-57 (1882).
,55 In Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1882), the Supreme Court described the
various situations in which shareholders may sue on behalf of the corporation.
Some action or threatened action of the managing board of directors or trustees of
the corporation which is beyond the authority conferred on them by their charter or other
source of organization;
Or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated by the acting manag-
ers, in connection with some other party, or among themselves, or with other sharehold-
ers as will result in serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other
shareholders;
Or where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own
interest, in a manner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other
shareholders;
Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are oppressively and illegally
pursuing a course in the name of the corporation, which is in violation of the rights of
the other shareholders, and which can only be restrained by the aid of a court of equity.
Recent cases have adopted this test for determining whether stockholders have standing to
sue. See, e.g., Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114, 116 (1957); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp.
508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For a similar formulation, see J.C.F. Holding Corp. v. General Gas &
Elec. Corp., 181 Misc. 283, 286, 46 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd mem., 267 App.
Div. 863, 47 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1944).
'"I For cases dismissing derivative actions because the plaintiff shareholders had no
standing to sue, see, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261
(1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903); Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U.S. 450 (1882); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 915 (1963); Ash v. International Bus. Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957).
"5 Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1957).
[44:168
Stockholder Derivative Actions
would be contrary to the best interests of the corporation.5
The requirement of standing to sue was clearly evidenced in
Swanson v. Traer. 59 In this case, the Supreme Court held that even
though the directors were "definitely and distinctly opposed to the
institution of litigation,"'60 thus satisfying the exhaustion require-
ment, it was still necessary to inquire whether "this suit is of that
exceptional character which stockholders may bring.""' On re-
mand, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that exhaustion of intracor-
porate remedies is not in itself sufficient ground for a dissident
shareholder to maintain a derivative action.8 2
While the necessity for standing is clear, there is little consen-
sus on what types of suits shareholders have standing to bring. An
examination of the various situations where shareholders have been
allowed to bring derivative actions illustrates the confusion in the
courts.
B. The Situations Where Shareholders Have Standing to Sue
While a refusal of the board of directors to act does not auto-
matically entitle shareholders to bring a derivative suit, it does not
necessarily preclude shareholder action.13 Shareholders are allowed
to sue if there is proof that the board of directors has wrongfully
refused to pursue a valid cause of action on behalf of the corpora-
tion. However, precisely what constitutes a wrongful refusal to sue
is far from clear.
1. Control or Conflict of Interest. If the directors are either
controlled by the alleged wrongdoer or interested in the transaction
attacked' to a degree which impairs the exercise of their business
judgment, a refusal to sue by the directors has not barred a deriva-
tive action by the shareholders.' 5 Courts, however, should ensure
that the directors are genuinely unable to exercise independent
'1 Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanzario-Societa Per Azioni, 69 F.R.D.
592, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
'" 354 U.S. 114 (1957).
10 Id. at 116.
"I Id.
249 F.2d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1957).
"3 Some courts have erroneously assumed that requiring demand on directors will some-
how frustrate minority shareholders' ability to maintain a derivative action. E.g., In re Kauff-
man Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 267 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). Other
than requiring that a copy of the complaint be mailed to the directors, the demand on
directors requirement does not affect the ability of shareholders to bring suit.
"3 See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1882).
"3 E.g., Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1969).
1976]
The University of Chicago Law Review
judgment before allowing shareholders to pursue the claim through
a derivative suit.1 66
2. Participation in an Injurious or Illegal Transaction. This
comment has argued that allegations of participation in an illegal
or injurious transaction absent self-interest or bias should not be
sufficient to excuse a failure to make demand on directors.'67 After
demand on directors has been made and refused, however, share-
holders should be allowed to bring a derivative suit if a majority of
the directors have participated in an injurious or illegal transac-
tion. 68 Shareholders have brought derivative actions to redress inju-
ries to the corporation caused by excessive salaries, 69 appropriation
of corporate opportunities,'7 0 improvident loans, 7' improper sale of
securities, 72 and improper sale of control.1 71 Shareholders have also
successfully challenged action by the directors that violated positive
law. 74
In many cases involving third party wrongdoers, the sharehold-
ers have argued that the decision by the directors not to sue should
not be respected by the court because the directors themselves are
liable for participation in the allegedly injurious or illegal transac-
' In Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966), for example, the plaintiff brought
a derivative action to redress injuries to the corporation arising from a past transaction.
Demand was made on the directors but was refused. The plaintiff alleged that the decision
of the directors not to sue should not bar a derivative action because the directors were
controlled by the alleged wrongdoer. Id. at 699. The court rejected this contention after
determining that the board of directors was not so controlled. Id. at 701.
"7 See text and notes at notes 63-75 supra.
"7 The shareholders must establish not only that the directors participated in the corpo-
rate transaction but also that the transaction was harmful to the corporation. In Hawes v.
Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882), a shareholder sought to enjoin the Contra Costa Co. from
permitting the City of Oakland to take more water than it was legally entitled to without
compensation. The Court dismissed the complaint, stating that "[ilt may be the exercise
of the highest wisdom to let the city use the water in the matter complained of." Id. at 462.
16, E.g., Smith v. Dunlap. 269 Ala. 97, 111 So.2d 1 (1959); Bachelder v. Brentwood Lanes,
Inc., 369 Mich. 155, 119 N.W.2d 630 (1963).
- 'IQ E.g., Higgins v. Shenago Pottery Co., 279 F.2d 46 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 899
(1960); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
,", E.g., Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 841 (1964).
,M' Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (S. Ct. 1940).
" Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
" E.g., Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962); Fanchon & Marco,
Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953). Shareholders may also bring
derivative actions for breach of the fiduciary duty of care based on alleged violations of
positive law. To prove a violation of fiduciary duty, however, shareholders must prove not
only that the challenged activities violated positive law, but also that the defendants knew
or should have known that the activities violated the law. E.g., Simon v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944).
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tion.'7 5 If the shareholders can prove that the directors are personally
liable, then the shareholders should be allowed to sue the third
party wrongdoer as well as the directors.
3. Negligence in Failing to Assert a Clear Cause of Action.
Some courts have allowed shareholders to sue when it appeared that
the directors had unjustifiably refused to assert a clear cause of
action.Y7 6 The majority of cases, however, have refused to consider
the merits of the cause of action asserted by the shareholders on the
ground that to do so would place the court in the position of substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the directors, which, if made in good
faith, should not be disturbed.' 77 Refusing to allow shareholders to
,,5 See, e.g., Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
" In Epstein v. Schenck, 35 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1939), for example, the plaintiff
shareholder challenged a series of compensation payments to third parties as being excessive.
Demand was made on the directors and refused. The directors claimed that since they had
engaged in no fraud or misconduct, their decision not to sue was final. The court rejected
this contention.
[Tihere may be extreme cases where, notwithstanding the honest and deliberate deter-
mination of the governing body, judicial interference in a representative suit is justified.
Where there is a clear cause of action, a refusal to enforce it may constitute a breach of
trust on the part of the directors . . . . [I]t is no answer on the part of directors that
they deemed it inexpedient to bring the action.
35 N.Y.S.2d at 981. See also Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616, 61 A. 1061 (Ch. 1905).
One prominent commentator has endorsed the view that shareholders should be allowed to
sue where the directors have failed to pursue a clear cause of action. "[W]here the right to
recover is clear, it would seem that the management has no right to refuse to sue, and that
where it does so refuse, the minority stockholders may sue in the place of the corporation."
13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5822, at 131 (rev. perm.
ed. 1970).
Most of the cases concerning standing have ignored the question whether a failure to
assert a clear cause of action is sufficient to confer standing on plaintiff shareholders. E.g.,
United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Corbus v. Alaska
Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882). In
none of these cases did the Court inquire into the merits of the controversy to determine
whether the directors' decision not to sue was justified. However, these cases contain language
that would allow shareholders to maintain derivative actions if directors failed to pursue a
clear cause of action. In United Copper, for example, it was stated that courts can interfere
with the decision of the directors not to sue when the directors "are guilty of misconduct
equivalent to a breach of trust." 244 U.S. at 264. Gross negligence in failing to assert a clear
cause of action could constitute a breach of trust, but the Court did not follow this line of
analysis.
In Courts may not interfere with the management of the corporation, unless there
is bad faith, disregard of the relative rights of its members, or other action seriously
threatening their property rights. This rule applies whether the mistake is due to error
of fact or of law, or merely to bad business judgment. It applies, among other things,
where the mistake alleged is the refusal to assert a seemingly clear cause of action . . ..
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1935) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). See also Ash v. International Bus. Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 493 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
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sue when the directors inexcusably fail to pursue a clear cause of
action, albeit in good faith, is inconsistent with the notion that
directors owe the corporation a fiduciary duty of care that logically
should extend to a decision not to sue. If shareholders are permitted
to sue when the directors breach their fiduciary duty of loyalty by
being interested in the transaction attacked, it is anomalous to pro-
hibit suit when the directors breach their fiduciary duty of care.7 8
This analysis does not suggest that the directors must enforce
every cause of action that the corporation might arguably possess.
Directors should consider the likelihood of success of the proposed
litigation, the direct and indirect costs'79 of such litigation measured
against the probable recovery, and the likelihood of commercial
disadvantage arising from the impairment of friendly commercial
relations with the defendants. 8 ° Although courts should be reluc-
tant to interfere with the internal affairs of a corporation, complain-
ing shareholders should be allowed to maintain a derivative action
where the corporate claim is clear, the costs of litigation are rela-
tively small in relation to the probable recovery, and a lawsuit
would not overly disrupt the commercial relations of the corpora-
tion.
4. Failure to Pursue a Constitutional Claim. A decision by the
board of directors not to pursue a constitutional claim has been
treated differently than a similar decision concerning a nonconstitu-
Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanzio-Societa Per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592, 596
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
I'l It could be argued that if the directors inexcusably fail to sue an alleged wrongdoer,
the shareholders should be relegated to a suit against the directors for breach of their fiduciary
duty of care. In such a case, the measure of damages would be the amount that could have
been recovered from the alleged wrongdoer. At least one case has allowed shareholders to sue
directors for failure to pursue a clear cause of action against a third party. Harris v. Pearsall,
116 Misc. 366, 190 N.Y.S. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1921), appeal dismissed, 202 App. Div. 785, 194 N.Y.S.
942 (1922). However, this approach has several problems. First, it is not helpful in explaining
the inconsistency of allowing derivative actions against alleged wrongdoers when directors
breach their fiduciary duty of loyalty. If suits against directors should be the exclusive remedy
for breaches of the duty of care, the same arguments can be made for making suits against
directors the exclusive remedy for breaches of the duty of loyalty. Second, there is a certain
harshness in forcing the directors to pay for the damage caused by an alleged wrongdoer; for
example, if the wrongdoer commits an antitrust violation that results in a $20,000,000 loss to
the corporation, it seems unjust to require the directors to pay this sum, even assuming that
they had the financial resources to do so. Finally, there are legal and factual issues incapable
of adequate resolution in a suit solely against the directors: questions such as whether the
alleged wrongdoer was actually liable, whether any affirmative defenses were available, and
the amount of damages.
"I' Indirect costs include unfavorable publicity concerning the corporation and the loss
of key employees. Demand on Directors, supra note 28, at 759-60 n.81.
11 Blake, The Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 143, 148-
49 (1961); Simon, Must We Sue? 17 Bus. LAW. 888 (1962).
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tional cause of action. In the leading case of Ashwander v. Tennes-
see Valley Authority,"'1 stockholders of an Alabama electric utility
brought a derivative action to enjoin the performance of a contract
between the utility and the TVA because the TVA's activities were
allegedly beyond the constitutional power of the federal govern-
ment. The case presented the Supreme Court with its first oppor-
tunity to consider the constitutionality of the TVA's sales of electric
power. While eight of the nine justices concurred in upholding the
constitutionality of the sales, the majority split evenly on the ques-
tion of whether the shareholders had standing to bring the action.
The lead opinion of Chief Justice Hughes stated that the failure of
the directors to resist an allegedly unconstitutional government
demand was sufficient to confer the requisite standing upon the
shareholders. 82 In the concurring opinion, however, Justice Bran-
deis, applying the business judgment rule, concluded that the share-
holders did not have standing since there was no showing of fraud
or collusion. 83
The lead opinion in Ashwander has left a legacy of confusion.
No apparent reason exists why shareholders should be more able to
pursue a constitutional claim than a statutory claim such as one
involving an antitrust violation 8 4 or illegal tax.'8 5 If the corporation's
best interests are served by dealing with the governmental instru-
mentality, shareholders should not be permitted to challenge the
directors' decision not to sue. The wisdom of the Brandeis approach
is perhaps evidenced by the narrowing of Ashwander in subsequent
lower court decisions.' 8
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
I 2 Id. at 318-23.
, Id. at 341-53.
United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
' Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903).
'u In Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the plaintiff,
a shareholder in Consolidated Edison Co. (Con. Ed.), brought a derivative action against Con.
Ed., the Public Service Commission of the State of New York, and the Finance Administrator
of the City of New York. The gravamen of the complaint against the Public Service Commis-
sion was that it followed an unconstitutional confiscatory rate-making policy with respect to
Con. Ed. The plaintiff also alleged that a tax levied against Con. Ed. by the City Finance
Administration unconstitutionally deprived Con. Ed. of property without due process of law.
Not surprisingly, the plaintiff relied exclusively on the lead opinion in Ashwander to
indicate that she had standing to maintain a derivative action. The court, however, distin-
guished Ashwander, stating that there the contention was that the government officials were
acting pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, whereas in the case at bar the contention was
that the government officials were acting under constitutional statutes but in an unconstitu-
tional manner. 386 F. Supp. at 583. It appears that courts are uncomfortable with the
Ashwander doctrine and will interpret it whenever possible to conform to the general rule that
courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the directors if the decision not to sue
1976]
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5. Refusal to Sue When Such Refusal Is Itself an Illegal Act.
In Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,'87 the plaintiffs
brought a derivative action against A.T.&T. and its directors for
injunctive relief to force A.T.&T. to sue the Democratic National
Committee for an outstanding debt from the 1968 convention. By
failing to collect the debt, A.T.&T. had allegedly made a contribu-
tion in violation of the federal prohibition on corporate campaign
spending.'8 8 The court stated that if the complaint had only alleged
failure to pursue a corporate claim, the shareholders would have had
no standing to attack the directors' decision not to sue.'89 But be-
cause the decision not to sue was itself an allegedly illegal act, the
court held that the business judgment rule was inapplicable and the
shareholders had standing to sue. " ' In the rare cases where the
directors' decision not to sue is itself illegal, the directors are not
exercising sound business judgment, and the shareholders should be
allowed to maintain a derivative action.
C. The Possibility of Separate Trials on the Standing
Requirement
Refusal by the board of directors to sue may constitute either
a reasonable act of discretion or a breach of trust, depending on the
circumstances.'91 If the shareholders cannot demonstrate that the
suit is of the "special character which stockholders may bring,"' 92
they have no standing to pursue the cause of action even if the
corporation itself would have a valid cause of action.'9 3 The standing
requirement thus ensures that the shareholders cannot wrest control
of the litigation from the corporation without an affirmative show-
was made reasonably and in good faith. See also Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
187 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
' Id. at 761.
Id. at 762.
1go Id.
'" W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPOAIONS § 5822, at 131 (rev.
perm. ed. 1970).
' Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 1957).
"3 An analogous procedure is followed in suits by employees against employers after the
union has refused to process a grievance. As in the relationship between shareholders and the
board of directors, the union represents its employees. Ordinarily the union's decision not to
prosecute a grievance is final, even if the employee has a valid grievance against his employer.
If the union breaches its duty of fair representation (the equivalent of the fiduciary duty owed
by directors) by refusing to process the grievance, the employee can sue his employer directly.
In the event, however, that the employee fails to prove that the union breached its duty of
fair representation, the suit is dismissed, no matter how meritorious the employee's claim
against the employer. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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ing that the directors are incapable of exercising sound business
judgment.
The protection afforded by the standing requirement is greatly
compromised by the conventional procedure allowing the sharehold-
ers to proceed to a trial on both the issue of standing and the merits
of the corporate claim against the alleged wrongdoer.'94 This proce-
dure allows complaining shareholders to engage in discovery and
litigation on all issues before affirmatively demonstrating that they
have standing to sue. Considerable wasteful litigation may result if
during or after the trial the court determines that the shareholders
lack standing and the suit is dismissed. The single trial procedure
may also increase the possibility of strike suits.
Recognizing that standing is the threshold question in all deriv-
ative actions, several district courts have either ordered separate
trials or limited discovery to the standing issue.'95 Under the sepa-
rate trial approach, litigation is limited to evaluating the business
judgment of the directors, and a consideration of the corporate
claim against the alleged wrongdoer is postponed. This procedure
has the advantage of focusing on the question of the shareholders'
right to bring the action before plunging into the merits of the com-
plex corporate transaction underlying the claim. If the shareholders
cannot prove that the directors are incapable of exercising sound
business judgment, the suit will be dismissed.
The recent case of Gall v. Exxon Corp.'95 provides an example
of the usefulness of both separate discovery and a separate trial on
the issue of standing. The plaintiff, a shareholder of Exxon, brought
a derivative action against the directors for violations of the securi-
ties laws, waste, and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint arose
"' In certain cases, the issues relevant to the standing issue and the corporate claim
against the alleged wrongdoer will coincide. See note 198 infra.
"I Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Nussbacher v. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 73 C 512 (N.D. Ill., April 22, 1976) (order granting separate trial);
Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bernstein v. Mediobanca Banca di
Credito Finanzio-Societa Per Azioni, 69 F.R.D. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Separate trials are authorized by rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides in relevant part:
Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue
or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (emphasis added). Implicit in rule 42(b) is the power to limit discovery
to the segregated issues. Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great N. Ry., 424 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
"1 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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out of the alleged payment of $59 million to Italian political parties
in order to secure favors and other allegedly illegal commitments.
The directors of Exxon, pursuant to a provision in the by-laws,
established a Special Committee on Litigation, composed of Exxon
directors not involved in the transaction attacked, to investigate the
claim. After a four-month investigation, the Committee concluded
that it would be contrary to the best interests of the corporation to
bring suit. The Committee directed Exxon to seek dismissal of the
derivative action on the ground that the decision not to sue was
made in the good faith business judgment of the directors of Exxon,
and the shareholders therefore had no standing to sue. The plaintiff,
however, challenged the disinterestedness and the bona fides of the
Special Committee. The court directed that the plaintiff be allowed
to test the independence of the Committee by discovery and, if
necessary, at a plenary hearing. By limiting discovery to the pro-
priety of the committee's decision not to sue, the court avoided
simultaneous discovery and litigation of the difficult question
whether the payments to the foreign officials were illegal. In the
event that the decision not to sue was found to be untainted by bias,
this issue would never be reached.1 97
Separate discovery and trials, however, will not be useful in
every case. When there is substantial overlap between the issues
relevant to the standing question and those relevant to the corporate
claim against the alleged wrongdoer, 9 8 a separate trial will normally
not be warranted.' But where the plaintiff's standing can be deter-
mined independently of the merits of the corporate claim, separate
discovery and trials serve a useful function and should be used more
often in shareholder derivative actions.
"97 A case very similar to Gall is Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In
Lasker, shareholders brought a derivative action under the securities laws against a mutual
fund, several of its directors, and-its investment advisor. When alerted to the action, the
board of directors appointed a disinterested group of directors to study the proposed action,
who in turn retained Stanley Fuld, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, to
review the controversy. After Judge Fuld determined that the prosecution of the proposed
action would be contrary to the best interests of the corporation, the directors moved to
dismiss the derivative suit. The plaintiffs, however, disputed the independence and good faith
of the minority directors appointed to study the claim. The court, recognizing that the
shareholders' ability to sue was "dependent" upon the independence of the minority direc-
tors, limited discovery to this issue. 404 F. Supp. at 1180.
"I There will be substantial overlap, for example, if the derivative suit is against all the
directors for breach of their fiduciary duty. If, however, the directors' decision not to sue is
attacked because the directors are controlled by the alleged wrongdoer or are biased because
of an alleged conflict of interest, the standing question can be resolved independently of the
merits of the corporate claim against the alleged wrongdoer.
'" 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE T 42.03, at 42-38 to -40 (2d ed. 1976).
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IV. THE EFFECT OF A NEGATIVE SHAREHOLDER VOTE
If the directors' decision not to sue is made reasonably and in
good faith, the minority shareholders have no standing to bring a
derivative action. If, however, the directors either fail or are unable
to exercise sound business judgment, the question remains whether
minority shareholders can be deprived of standing by a negative
shareholder vote. Under the business judgment theory, which re-
quires demand on shareholders in order that the shareholders may
determine whether the suit should be brought, a negative vote by
shareholders should result in a dismissal of the derivative action. '
In the famous case of S. Solomon & Sons Trust v. New England
Theatres Operating Corp.,'"' the court held that the minority stock-
holders did not have the legal right to insist that suit be brought
where a majority of disinterested stockholders acting reasonably
and in good faith02 had voted against pursuing the action.
Other courts have rejected this view and have held that a nega-
tive vote by shareholders does not deprive minority shareholders of
standing to maintain a derivative action.0 3 In jurisdictions which
adhere to the ratification theory and require demand only when the
wrong complained of is ratifiable,'2 4 a negative vote by shareholders
is a nullity if the underlying wrong is nonratifiable.2 11 Still other
21 Palley v. Baird, 356 Mass. 737, 254 N.E.2d 894 (1970); S. Solomont & Sons Trust v.
New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
Some courts that have adopted the business judgment theory in requiring demand to be
made on shareholders have refused to give effect to a negative vote by the shareholders. In
American Life Ins. Co. v. Powell, 262 Ala. 560, 567, 80 So.2d 487, 492 (1954), the Supreme
Court of Alabama held that demand on shareholders was necessary because they have "the
final authority to determine whether or not it would be good business policy" to sue. In Smith
v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97, 111 So.2d 1 (1959), the same court was faced with the question whether
a negative vote by shareholders barred a derivative action. The court held that the share-
holder could bring suit despite the adverse vote by a majority of the shareholders. Referring
to its prior decision in Powell, the court stated that "[it was not the intention of this Court
to hold that a majority of the stockholders could by ratifying fraudulent acts or by refusing
to seek redress for such acts thereby preclude a minority stockholder from bringing suit." 269
Ala. at 103, 111 So.2d at 6.
"1 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
202 Id. at 114-15, 93 N.E.2d at 249. Some commentators have suggested that the require-
ment that the shareholders act reasonably and in good faith means that the court must
conduct a limited review of the merits of the plaintiff's claim. See Note, The Nonratification
Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case for Limited Judicial Review, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1086, 1099 (1963).
2 E.g., Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962); Gottlieb v. McKee, 34
Del. Ch. 537, 107 A.2d 240 (Ch. 1954); Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 403, 65
A. 910 (1907); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912).
"I See text and notes at notes 99-102 supra.
20 Gottlieb v. McKee, 34 Del. Ch. 537, 107 A.2d 240 (Ch. 1954); Siegman v. Electric
Vehicle Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 403, 65 A. 910 (1907); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E.
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cases have held that a negative vote by the majority of shareholders
does not preclude complaining shareholders from bringing suit with-
out relying on the nonratifiability of the underlying wrong. 26 In
Rogers v. American Can Co., 2 7 the plaintiff brought a derivative
action against his corporation, the members of its board of directors,
and a second corporation for various antitrust violations.2 8 No de-
mand on the directors was necessary since they were disqualified
from exercising business judgment whether to sue by their illegal
involvement in the transaction attacked. The plaintiff made a de-
mand on the shareholders that was overwhelmingly rejected. 29 The
shareholders also reelected the individual defendants as directors. 21
The question before the court was whether the plaintiff had stand-
ing to bring the action in light of the adverse vote by an independent
majority of shareholders.21' The District Court had concluded that
the vote was an attempted ratification of a nonratifiable act rather
than an exercise of business judgment not to sue and therefore did
not deprive the shareholder of standing.212 The Third Circuit af-
firmed, 2 1 but held that even if the negative vote of the shareholders
was an expression of business judgment not to sue, this collective
judgment had to yield to the right of a minority shareholder to press
charges of violations of positive law.214
Two justifications, therefore, have been advanced for allowing
shareholders to maintain a derivative action despite a negative vote
by the majority shareholders-the nonratifiability of the alleged
wrong and the right of minority shareholders to expose violations of
positive law. Neither justification is persuasive. If the directors are
disqualified from exercising business judgment, the shareholders
are the only corporate organ available to determine whether bring-
ing suit is in the best interest of the corporation. Labeling an under-
lying wrong as nonratifiable should not deprive shareholders of this
power.
721 (1912). Technically, jurisdictions that adhere to the ratification theory do not require
demand on shareholders where the underlying wrong is nonratifiable. However, the complain-
ing shareholders may voluntarily make demand even when it is not required.
2" E.g., Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962).
207 Id.
21 Id. at 298-303.
20 Id. at 300.
210 Id.
"I Id. at 303.
212 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960), aff'd, 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962).
213 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962).
211 Id. at 317. In Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815, 818 n.2 (1st Cir. 1964), the court
assumed but did not decide that a negative vote by shareholders could bar a derivative suit.
The court acknowledged its disagreement with the Rogers holding.
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Disregarding a negative vote of the shareholders because of the
right of minority shareholders to expose violations of positive law is
no more convincing. The directors are not obligated to pursue every
cause of action, even those based on alleged antitrust violations. 21 5
The only difference between these cases and Rogers is that the direc-
tors in Rogers were disqualified from exercising business judgment.
Once it is acknowledged, however, that it is not in the best interests
of a corporation to sue for every alleged cause of action, it is unfair
to allow minority shareholders to thrust the corporation into pro-
tracted and costly litigation when a majority of the shareholders
disapprove of the action. The corporation should not lose its discre-
tion whether or not to sue because the directors are disqualified from
exercising sound business judgment, particularly when a disinter-
ested majority of the shareholders, the true equitable owners of the
corporation, votes against bringing suit. If the shareholders made an
informed and disinterested choice whether the suit should be
brought, 26 their negative vote should deprive minority shareholders
of standing to sue.
CONCLUSION
This comment has analyzed the requirements of exhaustion of
intracorporate remedies and standing to sue. To exhaust intracor-
porate remedies, a shareholder must make demand on both direc-
tors and shareholders as required by rule 23.1. Demand on directors
allows the directors an opportunity to occupy their normal role in
managing the corporation yet imposes little hardship on sharehold-
ers. Demand on directors should be required, therefore, if there is
any possibility that the directors will take remedial action in re-
sponse to the demand.
The demand on shareholders requirement, by contrast, does
not place the suit in the control of those who normally manage the
corporation and can be prohibitively expensive. Demand on share-
holders should be required only when the number of shareholders is
relatively small. The ratifiability of the wrong attacked should not
affect whether demand on shareholders is required; shareholders
should have the opportunity to exercise their business judgment on
"I United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Ash v.
International Bus. Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966);
Post v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 200 F. 918 (8th Cir. 1912).
2 The rationale underlying the liolding in Rogers may have been that the court did not
believe the shareholders' decision not to sue was informed. The shareholders were forced to
make the decision on the basis of a 250-word proxy statement. 305 F.2d at 299-300.
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whether the suit should be brought.
After the minority shareholders have satisfied the demand re-
quirements of rule 23.1, they must still establish standing to sue.
The standing requirement is not embodied in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure but is based on the premise that a shareholder
cannot bring an action unless the corporation's refusal to sue was
wrongful. Directors are not obligated to pursue all causes of action
which the corporation might arguably possess. In order successfully
to maintain a derivative action, therefore, a shareholder must prove
not only that the corporation has a valid claim against the alleged
wrongdoer, but that the corporation's refusal to pursue the claim is
wrongful. If the shareholder cannot prove that the decision not to
sue was wrongful, the suit will be dismissed even if the corporation
has a valid claim against the alleged wrongdoer. Recognizing that
standing is the threshold problem in derivative suits, several courts
have recently ordered separate trials and discovery on the standing
issue.
In the event that the directors are disqualified from exercising
sound business judgment, minority shareholders should be pre-
cluded from maintaining a derivative action by a negative vote of a
majority of the shareholders. Neither the nonratifiability of the al-
leged wrong nor the right of minority shareholders to expose viola-
tions of positive law is a sufficient ground to allow a shareholder to
bring suit against the will of an informed and disinterested majority.
Daniel R. Fischel
